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Abstract
In some countries the reform of public health care provision has been
accompanied by a parallel process of devolution that has also entailed the
organisation of health care becoming a regional competence. However, the
application of scal federalism in the context of the provision of health
care is not so straightforward due to the nature of the services involved.
In this paper we will concentrate on the related phenomenon of the soft
budget constraint phenomenon. This framework can be traced back to
that of a game where less e¢ cient local authorities prefer to send their
citizens to receive services outside their region instead of becoming more
e¢ cient. In order to improve the probability of being bailed out, the users
are sent to other local authorities where there is excess capacity. The lack
of coordination between local objectives and total welfare means that this
policy is optimal at local level, but ine¢ cient at Central Government level.
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1 Introduction
Public health care provision has undergone important reforms throughout the
past few decades. In some countries the creation of an internal market for
health care has been accompanied by a parallel process of devolution that has
also entailed the organisation of health care becoming a regional competence.
However, the application of scal federalism in the context of the provision of
health care is not so straightforward as might be expected.
The traditional literature on scal federalism is centered on the production
of goods and services that have mainly the characteristic of local public goods
whose cost may be mainly nanced through benet taxes. Health care 1 is
something quite di¤erent; from an economic point of view it might be classied
as an impure public good or a merit good, i.e. it is rival in consumption, it
can be supplied to local residents by providers located outside the boundaries
of the local authority, and it may be used as an indirect tool to equalise income
distribution. The provision of these goods opens a very interesting debate on
scal federalism as regards local taxes and grants in aid.2 In this paper we will
concentrate on the related phenomenon of Local Governments systematically
running into a decit (with local expenditure higher than local revenues) which
is often related to user mobility between local authorities.
If Central Government tolerates this behaviour and, sooner or later, bails
out the local authority, we have a soft budget constraint phenomenon. In this
way, scal federalism generates perverse e¤ects on economic growth.
This topic has not yet received due attention from the literature which
mainly deals with bailing out rms that run into decit. Levaggi and Zanola
(2004) and Bordignon and Turati (2006) show empirical evidence for the soft-
budget constraint. In both cases the focus is on expenditure rather than expla-
nation of the soft budget constraint itself. Wildasin (2004) proposes one of the
few theoretical models of bailing out at local government level. Wildasin as-
sumes the existence of two neighbour local authorities that produce local public
goods. However, the good produced by one local authority (B) spills its bene-
cial e¤ect also to residents of the other local authority (A). If the willingness
to pay for the good is di¤erent in the two regions, a possible equilibrium is one
where the local authority A provides the local public good in B and nances
such provision. In this way the residents of B free ride on use of the local public
goods. In other words we can say that local authority A bails out B as regards
the provision of that specic local public good.
The model presented in this paper shares some assumptions with Wildasins
but has some di¤erences:
1. The presence of a two-tier government structure. In our model we assume
the presence of a Central Government with the function of regulator and
1Health care, especially elective care, can be provided outside the area of residence of the
patient since the patient can travel, and often does, a long distance to receive the service; the
same argument applies to higher education.
2See Levaggi (2006).
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grants-in-aid distributor. The production of local public goods takes place
at local level and it is nanced locally and through grants-in-aid. Both
tiers have a budget constraint, but while the Central Governments one is
binding, Local Governments are allowed to run into a decit (so- called
soft budget constraint). Accordingly, a local decit implies an increase in
central taxes.
2. Local authorities supply health care and di¤er in their level of productive
e¢ ciency. The less e¢ cient region (B) may decide not to locally produce
the health care and send its patients to the more e¢ cient region (A) in
order to receive the service. In such a way a part of the cost is paid by
residents in A through the soft budget constraint.
This framework can be traced back to that of a game where less e¢ cient
local authorities prefer to send their citizens to receive services outside their
region instead of becoming more e¢ cient. This policy is supported by the more
e¢ cient region which, due to the shape of its utility function, prefers to produce
more goods than are locally needed. The lack of coordination between local
objectives and total welfare means that this policy is optimal at local level, but
ine¢ cient at Central Government level. The outcome of such game is a welfare
loss. There are in fact two clear losers:
a) the whole community, which would be better-o¤ if hard budget constraint
rules were imposed;
b) the users of the services in the regions where soft budget constraint is
widespread who have to travel and incur private costs.
The paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we present the peculiar
characteristics of the soft budget constraint in Italy, in Section 3 the model is
presented, Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 draws the conclusions.
2 Soft budget constraint in Italy
Health care in Italy represents a very good example of scal federalism applied
in a problematic context. Income is in fact unevenly distributed across regions,
hence the need to nance a great proportion of expenditure through grants-in-
aid. In Italy the regionalisation of health care expenditure is characterized by
two important facts which are presented in table one:
 some regions persistently run into decit;
 patient mobility across regions is fairly well-developed.
Table 1 about here
The data proposed in table 1 refer to 2005 and show that most of the re-
gions with decits also have a negative balance as regards health care; the only
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important exception is Lazio, but the behaviour of this region has probably
been dominated by other factors. Levaggi and Ruocco (2007) show some other
interesting facts: the regions that run into decit heavily rely on grants from
Central Government to nance health care (about 75% against a national av-
erage of 55%) because their tax base is fairly low compared with the other
regions. The mobility of patients across regions follows quite interesting pat-
terns: in some cases (Trento, Bolzano, Valle dAosta, Abruzzo, Molise, Umbria)
it depends on economies of scale. Small regions are not able to produce all the
services locally and prefer to specialise in a few of them; through mobility they
are then able to supply health care to all their population. The mobility pat-
tern is concentrated among adjacent regions and it is usually two-sided. This
behaviour can be consistently explained by the theory of scal federalism: it
corresponds to spillovers in the production of health services. However, only a
limited part of the mobility ow can be explained by this mechanism: most of
it is represented by a one-sided ow of patients from southern regions (running
into a decit) to northern regions. In the next sections we propose a model that
explains this evidence.
3 The model
In this article we present a very simple model. A county is divided into two local
authorities, A and B; which should provide a xed quantity S of health care to
their population. In Italy we can think of this level as the bundle of services that
make up LEA (Livelli Essenziali di Assistenza3 - Essential Assistence Levels).
Such provision is nanced through a linear income tax which is partly levied
at national level ( c) and partly at local level at rate  i, i 2 fA;Bg. To
simplify matters we assume that the two authorities are identical but?? in their
income and the cost to produce health care. Local authority A is richer and
more e¢ cient so that the same level of scal e¤ort produces more services in A
than in B. When resources are unevenly distributed and Central Government
wishes to pursue horizontal equity, a grant should be used to balance resources
distribution. The literature (King, 1994) has long debated whether resources
or expenditure should be equalised. Here, we use a mixed model where a social
planner maximises the trade-o¤ between utility of local residents and public
costs, by taking account of the fact that health care should not necessarily be
fully supplied in both local authorities. This allows a trade-o¤ to be developed
between general taxation and local welfare which will then be used to explain
why decentralised decisions can be di¤erent from those of a benevolent social
planner. The devolution of the decision of how much health care to provide
locally, in fact, means that each region might not choose the provision which
would be optimal at central level. In this context we show that the combined
3LEA were made operative in Italy after the enhancement of scal federalism for health
care. They dene a package of minimum services that each citizen in Italy is entitled to receive
independently of where he/she lives. Central Government assures that each Region has the
nancial resources to provide such level of services through a system of lump-sum grants.
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interests of the two local authorities might produce a soft budget constraint
equilibrium.
4 Central Government decision
In this section we present the optimal solution for an economy where Central
Government is the only actor and may decide how to allocate the production
of health care between the two regions. In a context of symmetric information
on local preferences and resources this solution represents the rst best for
that economy. The theory for scal federalism (King, 1994, Tresh, 2002 and
Levaggi, 1991) has long argued that such solution cannot be replicated in the
actual world because the Central Government is not able to observe all the
relevant parameters. In this model we assume symmetrical information in order
to isolate the e¤ect of decentralised decisions and soft budget constraint. This
solution also represents the rst step of the decision process for a decentralised
economy. At this stage, in fact, grants and optimal tax levels are set.
To explain the working of scal federalism, resources equalisation and local
autonomy we divide the process into two separate stages: Central Government
sets the level of production in A and B, and the total tax rate ( c+  i) in order
to maximise total welfare. In the second stage, Central Government sets all the
tax rates and grants in order to equalise resources. If local authorities choose
not to change any of these parameters, the scal federalism solution would be
equivalent to the centralised one. However, this is seldom the case because of
the asymmetry in the objective functions of Central and Local Governments.
While the former maximise the sum of all local authorities welfare, the latter
maximise their own welfares and these objectives do not necesarily coincide.
The two regions are equal and this means that the need for health care is
equal to S2 : Income is xed and it is equal to: YA and YB with YA > YB .
The marginal costs to produce health are equal to vA and vB with vA < vB , i.e.
local authority A is more e¢ cient than B in producing health care. Individuals
derive utility from their net income and the production of health care in their
region. The utility is linear in yield (Yi) and quadratic in the local health care
production (Si) and, for the region i; is
Ui = Yi(1   c    i) + ziSi   1
2
Si
2;
where  c and  i are the central and the local taxes, respectively, and zi is a
preference parameter coinciding with the level of Si maximising the utility. We
will assume that zB = SB2 and zA >
SA
2 i.e. the less e¢ cient region prefers to set
its production in such a way to supply health care to all its residents whereas
the more e¢ cient region (A) prefers to attract patients from outside. This
assumption can be justied on several grounds: it may depend on a reputational
e¤ect which attracts better physicians, it may depend on the existing structure
of production which may be set to provide care for a number of people greater
than the local needs.
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Central Government is assumed to be a benevolent regulator which should
set the national tax level ( c) and the grant (G) so that total welfare is max-
imised and resources are equalised. Equalisation of resources means that for a
specic equilibrium (SA; SB) the total tax rate should be uniform and set to
t =  c +  i which implies A = B =  l.
The problem faced by the Central Government can be written as
max
SA;SB ;t

YA(1  t) + zASA   1
2
SA
2 + YB(1  t) + zBSB   1
2
SB
2

; (1)
s.t.
vASA + vBSB = t (YA + YB) ;
SA + SB = S:
The two constraints imply that the total supply (SA + SB) must equate
the total demand (S) for health care. Furthermore, the Central Government
revenue (tYA+tYB) must equate the total expenditures for producing the health
care (vASA + vBSB).
The only solution to Problem (1) is
SCA =
S
2
+
zA   zB
2
+
vB   vA
2
; (2)
SCB =
S
2
 

zA   zB
2
+
vB   vA
2

; (3)
t =
1
2
S (vA + vB) + (vA   vB) (zA   zB + vB   vA)
YA + YB
; (4)
where the upperscript C stands for «centralized» solution. Since zA > zB and
vA < vB then SCA > S
C
B and, in particular, S
C
A >
S
2 and S
C
B <
S
2 . Under the
hypothesis that the health care demand is equally split between the two regions,
this implies that there is a ow of patients going from region B to region A.
This ow is measured by
SCI  SCA   SCB = zA   zB + vB   vA: (5)
The solution presented above shows that in allocating production, the Cen-
tral Government takes into account local preferences and costs.
4.1 Grants central government tax and preferred local ad-
ditional taxes
If a Central Government wishes to delegate some activities to local authorities,
then two main changes must be made in the previous problem (1):
1. the total tax rate t must be split into two taxes: a central one ( c) and a
local one ( l) which is imposed in order to achieve equalisation of the tax
bases; accordingly, we must substitute t by  c +  l;
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2. the rst constraint in problem (1) becomes
vAS
C
A + vBS
C
B +GA +GB = t (YA + YB) ;
where GA and GB are grants allocated to the local authorities by the
central government. This means that the tax rate t will be given by (4)
plus GA+GBYA+YB .
Now, we assume the Central Government will set  c,  l, GA, and GB in
order to achieve the following goals:
1. the local tax levied in A together with the grant must nance the produc-
tion of S2 :
 lYA +GA = vA
S
2
;
2. the local tax levied in B together with the grant must nance all the
production in B and the production in A not already nanced by the
local taxes and grant in A:
 lYB +GB = vBS
C
B + vA

SCA  
S
2

;
3. the central tax must nance all the grants
 c (YA + YB) = GB +GA:
If we put these three constraints together, we obviously have innite solutions
for  c,  l, GA, and GB . The choice will then mainly depend on political reasons.
In what follows we choose the solution that allows us to minimize the algebraic
complexity of the formulas and set GA = 0. Grants and optimal tax rates can
be summarized as follows:
 l =
1
YA
S
2
vA;
 c =
vBS
C
B + vAS
C
A
YA + YB
  1
YA
S
2
vA;
GB = vBS
C
B + vAS
C
A  
YB + YA
YA
S
2
vA:
5 Decentralised decision
Once Central Government has set national taxes and the grant, each local au-
thority decides the level of taxation and local production. The local authority
can perceive its budget as hard or as soft, i.e. it can have di¤erent expectations
about Central Government bail out decisions. We will examine both settings
by starting from a decentralised model where both local authorities have to be
budget-balanced and we will then move to a setting where only one of them has
to strictly respect its budget constraint. In this environment we will study the
opportunity for the two local authorities to bargain on the price for the fraction
of health care provided using mobility.
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5.1 Hard budget constraint
The optimal sharing of production that has been outlined in Section 4 may not
be the outcome of a process of decentralisation at local government level, even
in a setting where there is symmetric information between Central Government
and local authorities. This usually happens because the local authority does
not fully take into account the consequences of its actions on welfare (Petretto,
1999). This behaviour usually leads to a sub-optimal solution; in this section
we show the classical problem arising from lack of coordination: each local
authority maximises its own utility function whereas in the centralized model
the total welfare is maximized. Each local authority takes the national tax  c
and the grant Gi as given. The decision is somehow asymmetric for the two
local authorities given that each of them has a di¤erent variable cost to produce
health care.
5.1.1 Local authority B
The authority with higher marginal cost (B) does not like (zB = S=2) to attract
patients from the other local authority. In fact, providing health care to a
number of patients higher than S=2 would be very expensive because of Bs high
marginal cost. Its decision will then relate to the split between local production
(SDB ) and mobility (
S
2   SDB ). Such a decision depends on Bs preference and
on the price pA charged by A for health care. Some health care systems (Italy
among them) have set pA at national level, but it might become a strategic
variable in the game between local authorities. For this reason, in our model
we use it as a strategic variable.
In this way the game between the two local authorities is as follows: B sets
the number of cases to be sent to A as a function of pA and A accordingly sets
pA in order to maximise its utility. In this game A plays the role of a Stackelberg
leader given its advantage in terms of income and productivity.
The problem faced by the local authority B can be written as
max
SB ;B

YB(1   c   B) + S
2
SB   1
2
SB
2

;
s.t.
vBSB + pA

S
2
  SB

= BYB +GB :
where B is the tax on local income which can be used to nance a di¤erent
split between local provision and mobility than the one foreseen by Central
Government.
The optimal local tax is
B =
vB
S
2   (vB   pA)2  GB
YB
:
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The optimal amount of patients to treat (lets call it SDB ) is given by (see
Appendix 2)
SDB =
S
2
  (vB   pA) :
which in general is di¤erent from the production Central Government optimally
set (3). The di¤erence arises from the fact that when B maximises its utility, it
does not take into account the positive e¤ect that mobility has on its residents;
the second important di¤erence is that SDB depends on the price charged by A.
In a decentralised system the latter may not necessarily set a price equal to the
marginal cost.
5.1.2 Local authority A
The local authority A would like to attract patients (zA > S=2) from the nearby
region; to do so it may set a price (pA) it makes attractive for B to send its
patients toA (which is more e¢ cient in producing health care). This competitive
advantage puts A in a Stackelberg leader position since by setting pA it can make
B choose its preferred level of mobility.
Afer solving the decentralized problem for B, we have obtained SDB which is
lower than S=2. This means that A must satisfy the health care demand for a
number of patients given by its residents (S=2) plus the patients not treated in
B (i.e. S=2  SDB ). Since we have
S
2
  SDB = vB   pA;
the optimization problem for A can be written as
max
pA;A
(
YA (1   c   A) + zA

S
2
+ vB   pA

  1
2

S
2
+ vB   pA
2)
;
s.t.
vA
S
2
+ (vA   pA) (vB   pA) = AYA:
which is maximised with respect to the price charged to residents in B and
the local level of taxation A:
The optimal price is given by (see Appendix 3)
pA =
1
3

vA +
S
2
  zA + 2vB

;
A =  l +
(vA   pA) (vB   pA)
YA
which, in principle, can be higher or lower than vA. In fact,
pA < vA , vB   vA <
1
2

zA   S
2

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i.e. the price will be set lower than the marginal cost if the di¤erence in
productivity (measured by vB   vA) is lower than half the marginal utility of
increasing the production of health care in A.
The amount of patients who travel from B to A in order to receive treatment
is given by
SDI  SDA   SDB =

S
2
+ vB   pA

 

S
2
  (vB   pA)

= 2 (vB   pA)
=
2
3

vB   vA + zA   S
2

(6)
The comparison between the number of patients moving in the centralized
and in the decentralized models ((5) and (6) respectively) allow us to conclude
that (recall that vB = S2 )
SDI 
2
3

vB   vA + zA   S
2

< SCI  vB   vA + zA  
S
2
;
i.e. the number of patients treated outside B is always lower than in the rst
best equilibrium. This produces an increase in the utility function of residents
in B, but it certainly reduces that of residents in A who are the net losers of this
allocation since they su¤er an increase in their local tax rate and a reduction in
the number of admissions to their hospitals.
5.2 Soft budget constraint
In the previous paragraph we have shown why the parameters chosen by Cen-
tral Government may become sub-optimal in the context of decentralisation.
Another and even more perverse e¤ect may derive from the interpretation of
the budget constraint by local authorities as soft.
In Italy there are two main methods to bail out regions that run into decit.
The rst one, which could be dened as a direct method, consists of o¤ering the
Regions that have a persistent budget decit to wave half of it in exchange for
the agreement to cover the other half with local resources. Since this process
is repeated through time, the Central Government pays for the whole decit.
The second method is even more subtle: the allocation of the grant to local
authorities for a certain year is provisional; it may increase in the future if
the Region has a decit. This means that ex post the decit of a Region may
appear to be lower than it actually is. The rationale for this policy is that
Central Government recognizes that the process of allocating resources may be
awed since preferences and local needs are di¢ cult to estimate, but it creates
a ratchet e¤ect mechanism that is very dangerous.
The model assumes a bargaining process between the two local authorities.
Each of them maximises its own utility function separately in a sort of Nash
equilibrium framework. The basic idea behind the model we are going to present
is that an agreement exists between the two local authorities. A, the richest
and most e¢ cient, would like to increase its production beyond its local need
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S=2. To do so, it tries to attract patients from B in exchange for a reduction
in the cost to provide health care. A possible solution is the one presented
in the previous paragraph, but such equilibrium is unsatisfactory for several
reasons: Central Government may impose a price on interregional mobility, and
the local authority A may nd it di¢ cult to increase  l from a political point
of view. The second possibility is to induce Central Government to supply B
with extra resources provided they are used to nance mobility from B to A.
The mechanism of the soft budget constraint in our model responds to this
objective. The rules of the game are such that if both local authorities agree
that the decit should be repaid, Central Government does so by increasing the
national tax level t. A agrees to pay for the debt of B only if it is supported by
mobility of patients from B to A.
In this way, while the price for mobility from B to A is set to its marginal
cost vA, B nances only a fraction pA and runs into a decit. The actual
level of the decit which B incurs is determined by A by setting the number of
patients that A is willing to receive from B (SDI ).
Both local authorities are apparently better-o¤ than in the previous decen-
tralised solutions:
 local authority A can share the cost of o¤ering health care at a price
lower than its marginal cost with the residents in B. In the presence of
a soft budget constraint, in fact, the mobility from B to A is reimbursed
at its marginal cost so that A does not need to increase its local tax
rate. The decit will be paid through an increase of the national tax rate
which is paid by both local authority residents. In this way A also has a
political advantage: the burden in terms of popularity of increasing the
scal pressure is borne by Central Government;
 local authority B can decrease local taxation and can bargain with A how
much of its health care cost to shift. This policy allows the local authority
to o¤er a sort of compensation to the residents that need to incur an extra
cost to receive health care outside B.
In this context, although local authority A has more income and is more
productive, it cannot act as a Stackelberg leader because both local authorities
need to agree on a common strategy. For this reason in this case the rst local
authority decides.
5.2.1 Local authority B
The local authority B decides how much of the total cost of health care provided
by A it will nance with local taxes and to some extent it will also x the decit
it is prepared to incur. If we dene r as the fraction of the price pA B is prepared
to nance with local taxes, the budget constraint for local authority B can be
written as:
vB

S
2
  SDI

+ SDI vA = YBB +GB + S
D
I rvA:
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The local authority foresees that its decit SDI (1  r)pA will have to be met
by an increase in the national tax rate, i.e. Central Government will have to set
 c =
SDI (1  r)vA +GB
YA + YB
:
The problem for the local authority can be written as:
max
r;B
(
YB

1  S
D
I (1  r)pA +GB
YA + YB
  B

+ zB

S
2
  SDI

  1
2

S
2
  SDI
2)
s.t.
vB

S
2
  SDI

+ SDI rvA  GB = YBB
and the above constraint. The solution, presented in appendix four, can be
written as:
r = 0
B =
vB
 
S
2   SDI
 GB
YB
:
5.2.2 Local authority A
By the agreement we have described above, A knows that the patients that it
receives will be nanced using the soft budget constraint and that the tax rate
set by Central Government will increase. Given that only the decit arising
from mobility will be repaid, it can decide the amount of decit B can incur by
setting SDI . As before, it knows that the policy of soft budget constraint will
change the tax rate, i.e.
 c =
SDI (1  r)vA +GB
YA + YB
:
In this context we also assume that the price A can charge to B is equal to
the marginal cost of production, vA: This level allows A to set its tax rate to
the level  l:4
The problem for local authority A can be written as:
max
SDI
(
YA
 
1  S
D
I (1  r)vA +GB
YA + YB
  vA
S
2
YA
!
+ zA

S
2
+ SDI

  1
2

S
2
+ SDI
2)
whose solution is
SDI =

zA   S
2

  YA
YA + YB
vA(1  r)
4This policy can be implemented in several ways. As noted before, Central Government
may set a price lists for health care delivered through interregional mobility. An indirect way
to obtain the same result would be to x a minimum tax level  . The reason for this second
policy will be clear in what follows.
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5.2.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium with the soft budget constraint is identied by nding r and
SI :This can be done by substituting in the equation for r and S
D
I the optimal
values of the reaction functions of the other local authority. In this case, the
solution is recursive since r does not depend on SDI :
The solution can be written as:
r = 0
SI =
 
zA   12S
  YAYA+YB vA ? SCI = 12  zA   S2 + (vB   vA)
B =
vB(S2 SDI ) GB
YB
A =  l
c =  c +
vA
YA+YB

zA   12S   YA vAYA+YB

In the nal solution, local authority A is budget balanced and is allowed to
produce more than under a decentralised solution with a soft budget constraint.
This solution is then preferred by this local authority as it increases production
and reduces the tax rate. Local authority B reduces its level of taxation and its
internal production, but it is not necessarily better o¤ from a strictly welfare
point of view. The actual comparison is rather cumbersome from an algebraic
point of view; but what is important for our discussion is that the soft budget
constraint policy does not necessarily imply a benet for the region that incurs
it.
6 Discussion
The model presented shows that scal federalism may not always be benecial as
the traditional literature shows. The main problem is that at local government
level a coordination problem among policies implemented at this level may exist.
Each local authority maximises its utility, but does not take account of the
e¤ects on the welfare of the other Regions and, in the end, the solution is
welfare decreasing. What is even more interesting is that sharing of the benets
of the policy may not be as expected; in particular it is not necessarily the
Region that incurs a decit that benets most from the soft budget constraint
policy.
To show this, we ran a simulation based on our model. We assumed that
income in region Ais 50% higher than in Region B while cost is 30% higher in
the latter. Expenditure for health care is about 7% of total GDP. The inital
parameters are as follows:
Parameters YA YB vA vB S zA zB
Value 150 100 1 1.3 20 13 10
and the results are summarised in Table 1.
The centralised solution may be used as benchmark and shows that a co-
ordinated policy would maximise total welfare, but it does not maximise the
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Table 1: Simulation results
Parameters Centralised HBC-1 HBC-2 SBC
pA - 1 0.2 1
r - - - 0
SCA 11.65 10.3 11.1 12.4
SCB 8.35 9.7 8.9 7.6
t 0.090 - - -
 c 0.066 0.023 0.023 0.032
A 0.023 0.066 0.072 0.066
B 0.023 0.070 0.059 0.040
GB 5.838 5.838 5.838 5.838
UA 220.08 217.35 218.31 219.37
UB 139.63 140.54 141.10 139.73
UT 359.72 357.90 359.42 359.16
utility of people living in B. This opens a space for three types of decentralised
solutions depending on whether the two local authorities have a form of bargain
in reaching a better solution. When the budget constraint is taken as hard, the
HBC-1 solution represents the case in which each local authority maximises its
utility and takes the behaviour of the other local authority as given. In this
case, A su¤ers a loss of utility because it receives a small number of patients
from B. This solution can be improved upon by allowing A to make B pay
a price lower than the marginal cost to produce health care (HBC-2). In the
presence of a soft budget constraint (SBC), when local authorities can run into
a decit, A is better o¤ than in the previous simulation, but it is not B that
su¤ers a reduction in its utility. This result is quite interesting. B prefers the
soft budget constraint to the centralised solution, but if it could make its policy
to respect its budget constraint credible, it would be able to attain a higher
level of welfare.
This conclusion is in line with the literature on decentralisation in health
care (Petretto, 2000). In our model we add another dimension represented by
the presence of a soft budget constraint. Such a policy is usually associated in
the political discussion with the deviating behaviour of some local authorities
that autonomously decide to spend more than what they should. Given the
nature of health care, Central Government has to bail them out and has to
make the virtuous Region pay for it.
In our model we have shown that the process may be rather di¤erent. Soft
budget constraint behaviour arises from a bargaining solution between the Re-
gions in which they anticipate that the decit will have to be covered at central
level.
The presence of a soft budget constraint is welfare decreasing for the com-
munity as a whole, but it shares the benets between the two local authorities
in ways that have not been explored so far. The real winner is in fact A, the
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local authority that respects its budget and that appears to be the virtuous one.
7 Conclusions
The traditional literature on scal federalism suggests that the allocation of
functions to local governments should follow e¢ ciency principles. The choice
of the quantity to be produced should be left to the lower tier which knows
local preferences better than the centre. Nevertheless, in order to nance the
local provision, grants might be used for equity and e¢ ciency reasons, and the
presence of grants balancing for uneven distribution in both resources and needs
is one of the main arguments in favour of the application of strict budget balance
rules. This means that any expenditure in excess of that nanced by Central
Government should be paid by local taxes. However, the traditional literature
on scal federalism is centered on the production of goods and services that have
mainly the characteristic of local public goods. In the recent past the process of
scal federalism has extended the category of goods and services to be provided
at local level to include also services that are both impure public goods and
merit goods, i.e. they are rival in consumption and can be supplied to local
residents also by providers located outside the boundaries of the local authority.
The use of scal federalism in this case is quite problematic for the regulator
which is left with very few options for making local government replicate the rst
best solution. This is a well-known result; what our model adds to the previous
literature is the e¤ect of soft budget constraint on welfare. In this article we
have shown that soft budget constraint policies are quite welfare worsening in
this context and that the true loser is not necessarily the local authority that
respects its budget. The use of a soft budget constraint along with passive
mobility in fact reduces total welfare of the population that has to move and
usually this aspect is not su¢ ciently taken into account by the decision makers.
The solution to this problem is not easy, but it seem that this policy should be
avoided as far as possible.
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A Appendix one: Solution of the Central Gov-
ernment problem
The Lagrangean can be written as:
L = YA(1  t) + zASA   12SA2 + YB(1  t) + zBSB   12SB2 1 (vASA + vBSB   t(YA + YB))
 2 (SA + SB   S)
The F.O.C.can be written as:
@
@t =  YA   YB + 1YA + 1YB = 0 1 = 1
@
@SA
= zA   SA   2   vA1 = 0
@
@SB
= zB   SB   2   vB1 = 0
which can be solved to give the solutions presented in the text.
B Appendix two: Hard budget constraint - Bs
decision
The problem is given by:
max
SB ;B

YB(1   c   B) + S
2
SB   1
2
SB
2

;
s.t.
vBSB + pA

S
2
  SB

= BYB +GB :
The Lagrangean can be written as:
L = YB(1 t B)+zBSB  12 (SB)2 
 
vBS
D
B + vA(
S
2   SB)  BYB +GB

@
@B
= YB   YB = 0 1 = 1
@
@SB
= zB   SB + vA   vB = 0
Substituting the rst constraint in the second it is possible to write
SDB =
S
2
  (vB   pA) :
and to obtain B from the budget constraint.
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C Appendix three: Hard budget constraint -
As decision
max
pA;A
(
YA (1   c   A) + zA

S
2
+ vB   pA

  1
2

S
2
+ vB   pA
2)
;
s.t.
vA
S
2
+ (vA   pA) (vB   pA) = AYA:
The Lagrangean can be written as:
L = YA(1  t  A) + zA(S2 + vB   pA)  12 (S2 + vB   pA)2
    vA S2 + (vA   pA) (vB   pA)  AYA
The F.O.C can be written as:
@
@pA
=  zA + 12S + vB   pA + vB   2pA + vA = 0
@
@A
=  YA + YA  = 1
Substituting the second equation in the rst one we can write:
pA =
1
3 (vA +
S
2   zA + 2vB)
From the budget constraint we can then write
A =  l +
(vA pA)(vB pA)
YA
D Appendix four: Soft budget constraint. De-
cision by local authority B.
max
r;B
(
YB

1  S
D
I (1  r)vA +GB
YA + YB
  B

+ zB

S
2
  SDI

  1
2

S
2
  SDI
2)
s.t
vB

S
2
  SDI

+ SDI rvA  GB = YBB
r  0; r  1
The Lagrangean can be written as:
L = YB

1  SDI (1 r)vA+GBYA+YB   B

+ zB
 
S
2   SDI
  12  S2   SDI 2
   vB  S2   SDI + SDI rvA  GB   YBB
The FOC can be written as:
@L
@r = YBvA
SDI
YA+YB
  vASDI
@L
@B
= YB   YB
The second derivative is always negative, hence r = 0 and by substitution
B =
vB(S2 SDI ) GB
YB
:
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Table 1: Some indicators for health care expenditure and mobility
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